Dennis Sykes, Dwane J. Sykes, Patricia Sykes, & Johnny Iverson v. Howard F. Hatch, Marjorie S. Hatch, Howard Hatch & Associates v. Anthony Ragozzine, Ruth W. Ragozzine, Provo Land Title Co. Leon Peter Pierotti & Karen E. Pierotti v. Leon Peter Pierotti & Karen E. Pierotti  : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Dennis Sykes, Dwane J. Sykes, Patricia Sykes, &
Johnny Iverson v. Howard F. Hatch, Marjorie S.
Hatch, Howard Hatch & Associates v. Anthony
Ragozzine, Ruth W. Ragozzine, Provo Land Title
Co. Leon Peter Pierotti & Karen E. Pierotti v. Leon
Peter Pierotti & Karen E. Pierotti : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Howard F. Hatch.
Dwane J. Sykes; Patricia Sykes; Dennies L. Sykes; Johnny Iverson; Frederick Jackman.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Sykes v. Hatch, No. 920470 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4442
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DENNIS L. SYKES, DWANE J. SYKES, 
PATRICIA SYKES and JOHNNY IVERSON, ; 
Plaintiffs, Appellee, and 
Cross-Appellant, 
V 5 •
 A 
HOWARD F. HATCH, MARJORIE S. ] 
HATCH, HOWARD HATCH AND ] 
ASSOCIATES (formerly Equitable ] 
Realty, Inc.). 
Defendants and Appellants. 
HOWARD F. HATCH, MARJORIE S. ! 
HATCH, HOWARD HATCH AND ] 
ASSOCIATES (formerly Equitable 
Realty, Inc.). ! 
Counterclaimants, ] 
Third-Party Plaintiffs ] 
and Appellants, 
vs. ] 
ANTHONY RAGOZZINE AND RUTH W. ' 
W. RAGOZZINE, 
PROVO LAND TITLE COMPANY, 
LEON PETER PIEROTTI AND ] 
KAREN E. PIEROTTI, ] 
Third-Party Defendants ] 
and Appellees. \ 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
i Case No. 920470-CA 
(Supreme Court No. 920160) 
i Priority No. 29(b)(16) 
I Lower Court No. CV 810457127 
I UTAH C O U R T OF APPEALS 
1
 C vV.Hi'iT 
K •;- U 
I DOCKET NO.. / y 
APPEAL FROM THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE DAVID L. MOWER, PRESIDING 
Frederick Jackman, Esq. 
Attorney for Provo Land Title 
1327 S. 800 East 
Orem, UT 84058 
Howard F. Hatch 
843 South 1150 East 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
Ph: 785-4818 / 227-6598 
Dennis L. Sykes, Johnny Iverson 
Patricia 4 Dwane J.Sykes, c/o 
1511 So. Carterville Road 
Orem, UT 84058 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 
Issues 2 
Standard of Review 2 
STATUTES AND RULES WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
A. Nature of the Case 3 
B. Summary of Proceedings and Disposition 4 
C. Statement of Facts 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 9 
1. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment 
only where there are no genuine issues of material fact. 9 
2. An involuntary dismissal (Rule 41(b) is same as summary 
judgment under Rule 56(c). 9 
3. Neither this state's nor federal courts have allowed 
summary dismissals (or judgments) to stand where there 
are questions of material fact remaining. 10 
ARGUMENTS 10 
CONCLUSION 10 
ADDENDA: 
A. Order and Judgment filed July 25, 1991. 
B. Court's Sua Sponte Order filed February 21, 1992. 
C. Notice of Interest in Real Property 
D. Notice of Prior and Superior Interest, etc. 
E. Trustee's Deed 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED: Page 
Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P. 2d 238 (Utah 1977) 2 
Burnham v^ Bankers Life i& Cas. Co. 470 P.2d 261 (Ut 1970) 3 
Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977) 2 
Heathman v. Fabian, 14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (Utah 1962) 10 
Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P. 2d 613 (Utah 1982) 3 
Livingston Industries, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 
5^5-p^
 2d 11 rt-jVtlh-Vm)—T.... 2,10 
Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P.2d 747 (Utah 1952) 3 
Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P. 2d 297 (Utah 1953) 2 
Themy v. Seagull Enters. Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979) 3 
Winegar v. Slim Olson, Inc. 122 Utah 487, 252 P. 2d 205 (UT 1953) 9 
STATUTES AND RULES CITED: 
§78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended 1 
§78-2a-3(2)(k), ' ' " 1 
Rule 41(b) Utah R. of Civ. P 9 
Rule 56(c), Utah R. of Civ. P 3, 9 
Rule 4-501(9), Article 5, Code of Judicial Administration ... 9 
ii 
Howard F. Hatch 
843 South 1150 East 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
Ph: 785-4818 / 227-6598 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DENNIS L. SYKES, DWANE J. SYKES, ] 
PATRICIA SYKES and JOHNNY IVERSON, ] 
Plaintiffs, Appellee, and 
Cross-Appellant, 
%# c 
vs.
 t 
HOWARD F. HATCH, MARJORIE S. ] 
HATCH, HOWARD HATCH AND ] 
ASSOCIATES (formerly Equitable ] 
Realty, Inc.). 
Defendants and Appellants. 
HOWARD F. HATCH, MARJORIE S. ' 
HATCH, HOWARD HATCH AND ] 
ASSOCIATES (formerly Equitable ] 
Realty, Inc.). ] 
Counterclaimants, ] 
Third-Party Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
vs. 
ANTHONY RAGOZZINE AND RUTH W. ] 
W. RAGOZZINE, ] 
PROVO LAND TITLE COMPANY, ] 
LEON PETER PIEROTTI AND ] 
KAREN E. PIEROTTI, 
Third-Party Defendants 
and Appellees. 
t BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
i Case No. 920470-CA 
i (Supreme Court No. 920160) 
i Priority No. 29(b)(16) 
i Lower Court No. CV 810457127 
JURISDICTION: 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
§78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, but has poured 
over this case to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(k) 
and is based on the Appellant's timely Notice of Appeal dated March 
23, 1992. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
Issues: (1) Whether the trial court erred in overlooking, or 
ignoring, our counterclaim and third party complaint in the first 
instance (R. 1021 and Addendum A) and providing absolutely no rational 
for its dismissal of our counterclaims in its final order (R. A1106 
and Addendum B ) . 
(2) If it was the intention of the lower court to dismiss our 
case summarily, as it would appear, without a trial on the merits, 
then we charge this to be an abuse of discretion. Sufficient evidence 
had already been introduced on the issue of forgery of documents (R. 
409-20, 1042 and 1046), slander of title (R. 62-63), misappropriation 
of water stock (R. 52 and R. 4891H.), trespass (R. 62-63 & R. 488flj.) 
and other matters, to support the claim that a true controversy did 
exist for a trial to be had. 
Standard of Review: "On review of a summary judgment ..., the 
party against whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have 
all the facts presented and all the inferences fairly arising there-
from, considered in a light most favorable to him. Morris v. Farns-
worth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P. 2d 297 (Utah 1953). See also Bill 
Brown Realty, Inc. v^ Abbott, 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 1977); Livingston 
Industries, Inc. v_^  Walker Bank & Trust Co., 565 P. 2d 1117 (Utah 
1977). 
"Upon review of a grant of motion for summary judgment the 
Supreme Court applies the same standard as that applied by the trial 
court." Durham v. Margetts, 571 P. 2d 1332 (Utah 1977). 
This holds true with a summary dismissal as well (both are 
•.reated the same since they operate the same): 
In reviewing a dismissal which is granted against a 
plaintiff, the court must review all of the evidence, 
together with every logical inference which may fairly be 
drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P. 2d 747 
(Utah 1952) 
Because disposition of a case on summary judgment denies the 
benefit of a trial on the merits, the appellant court must 
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
losing party, and affirms only where it appears there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material issues of fact, or where, 
even according to the facts as contended by the losing 
party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Themy v. Seagull Enters. Inc., 595 P. 2d 526 (Utah 
1979). 
STATUTES AND RULES WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE 
Under Utah Statute, summary judgment (or dismissal) is provided 
for only: 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. (Rule 56(c), U. Rul. of Civ. P.) 
"Summary judgment is inappropriate where there are disputed 
issues of material fact." Burnham v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 470 
P.2d 261 (Utah 1970). 
A motion for summary judgment should be denied where the 
evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact which, if 
resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, would entitle him 
to judgment as a matter of law. Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P. 
2d 613 (Utah 1982). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. The original Complaint in this case was 
filed by Dwane Sykes, et al., and named nine different causes of 
action: breach of contract and fiduciary, interference with contract, 
trespass, adverse possession and a variety of others including inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress (R. 14-36). The case was 
begun primarily as a breach of contract case. In bringing the action, 
Sykes was essentially trying to avoid prosecution by the County Attor-
ney for attempted extortion. A complaint had been made and the County 
Attorney's office was poised, ready to bring charges when this case 
was filed in civil court. 
The thrust of Mr. Sykes1 complaint was that he had been given an 
option to purchase the north half of certain real property located on 
Carterville Road in Orem, Utah, then belonging to the Plaintiffs, 
which we refused to honor (R. 35H8). The claimed basis of this was a 
document entitled "NOTICE OF INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY" (R. 10 and 
Addendum C), unilaterally asserted by one of the Plaintiffs, Dennis 
Lynn Sykes, a brother to Dwane J. Sykes. 
The Appellants responded with a counterclaim and third-party 
complaint charging the Plaintiffs/Appellees with trespass and damage 
to real property, slander of title, forgery of documents, interference 
in an advantageous business relationship and the wrongful appropria-
tion of water stock. The third-party complaint brought in others 
implicated in the water stock matter and claimed breach of contract 
by the Pierottis under a sale of adjacent property(R. 61-66 & R. 938). 
B. Summary of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court. 
(1) A settlement was eventually achieved with the Pierottis and 
the Ragozzines were voluntarily dismissed by us (since she was without 
representation and her husband, Anthony Ragozzine had died). 
(2) In the lower court's initial Order and Judgment, Judge Mower 
dismissed summarily the initial complaint but failed to address the 
issues contained in the Appellants' counterclaim and third-party com-
olaint (R. 1021 and Addendum A ) . In its most recent order, Judge 
lower does dismiss specifically Provo Land Title and says he intended 
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5. While we vehemently denied having ever done any act which 
would have given validity to such a document in its then form, and 
waged an extensive battle to force Sykes to produce this document in 
the original (R. 409-20, 1042 & 1046 p. 2-5) so it could be tested for 
authenticity, i.e., not having been altered, added to or forged, we 
were never successful in forcing the Sykes to produce the document. 
6. In order to show consideration for the claimed option, Dwane 
Sykes even altered, after it had been cashed, the $1,000 check paid to 
us for the south half in an attempt to show that it was to have served 
as option money on the north half as well (R. 1050: Exhibits 1 & 3 and 
R. 1042 where he admits to the alteration). 
7. During the intervening time, from late 1979 until March of 
1981, Dwane Sykes was doing all in his power to slander our title to 
the subject property and to scare off any potential purchasers (Please 
see affidavit of Stephen W. Thomas, R. 140-142 of companion case cur-
rently on appeal, No. 920437-CA). Sykes had not only torn down our 
realty signs but had posted the property with signs saying "no 
trespassing, property of D. Sykes" and also the following warning in 
very large letters: "WARNING THIS LAND'S N0J_ FOR SALE ANY PROSPEC-
TIVE PURCHASER IS BUYING INTO A LAWSUIT, D. SYKES, OWNER." (Please see 
R. 1340 of companion case currently on appeal, No. 920437-CA). 
8. By late 1982, because of a downturn in real estate activity 
in the county, my business affairs had begun to deteriorate and I was 
beginning to be in serious need of cash. Payments to Zions Bank to 
cover a mortgage given on the subject property had become delinquent 
and Zions threatened to foreclose. With all of our efforts to sell 
the property being frustrated by Sykes' efforts to slander the title, 
we turned to the daughter of a friend who had recently acquired 
$25,000 from an insurance settlement, offering to give her the land as 
colateral. 
9. Because of Sykes1 title claims against the subject property, 
we were not in a position to offer outright title, we could only offer 
the note and deed of trust previously taken by Zions Bank. 
10. After determining Zion's willingness to make such a transac-
tion, i.e., to receive the $25,000.00 as satisfaction of the debt in 
exchange for the note and deed of trust it held, we arranged a meeting 
with the Bank's attorney, Mr. Beckstead, to effect the exchange. On 
the very day of this meeting, September 7, 1982, Dwane Sykes filed of 
record what he titled a "NOTICE OF PRIOR AND SUPERIOR INTEREST IN REAL 
PROPERTY AND OF PHYSICAL POSSESSION PRIOR TO ANJ) THEREBY SUBORDINATING 
ZIONS BANK'S APRIL 14, 1978, DEED OF TRUST, IRRESPECTIVE OF RECORDING 
DATES." (Emphasis his: please see R. 121,2 of companion case current-
ly on appeal, No. 920437-CA, and Addendum D. attached). 
11. That same day Dwane Sykes personally served such a notice on 
Stewart Title Company and representatives of Zions Bank. He also 
forced his way into the private meeting we, Marjorie Hatch and myself, 
were having with Virginia Flynn, the party who had agreed to purchase 
the note and deed of trust. Being refused an opportunity of confront-
ing her with his NOTICE, and restrained only by physical force, he 
further pursued her to her place of residence, insisting on an 
audience. When refused, he served upon her a copy of the aforesaid 
NOTICE, demanding that she read it and be so warned (see Affidavit of 
Virginia Flynn, R. 129-131 in companion case currently on appeal, No. 
920437-CA). 
12. While she was willing to continue to go forward with the 
transaction in spite of Sykes' warnings, she did accept the return of 
the money which had been tendered upon the Bank's insistence. The Bank 
had become very concerned that possibly Sykes' claims might be genuine 
and did not want to become subject to a damage claim later brought 
against them by Virginia Flynn, even though they had obtained a waiver 
of liability, (R. 130 and R. 1381-82 in companion case currently on 
appeal, No. 920437-CA). 
13. The delay attendant to these negotiations caused the trustee 
sale which had been posted for September 8, 1982, to be cancelled. It 
was determined by the Bank to have recourse to Stewart Title Company, 
which admitted to having overlooked certain items of record which 
could have invalidated Zions' conduct of the trustee sale, (R. 1341-47 
in companion case currently on appeal, No. 920437-CA). 
14. But Zions only pursued that intention for a few months. 
Stewart Title Company was dragging its feet and failing to make good 
on its commitment. So when, in March of 1983, Sykes' attorney 
contacted the bank saying he, Sykes, or someone friendly to him, would 
purchase the property at trustee sale if the Bank would renotice it, 
(R. 1380 in companion case currently on appeal, No. 920437-CA).), the 
Bank decided to repost the trustee sale rather than wait for Stewart 
Title to thrash out Sykes1 claims in a judicial foreclosure action (R. 
123-24 in companion case currently on appeal, No. 920437-CA).) 
15. When this was done, and the property put up for trustee sale 
on May 4, 1983, Dwane Sykes and William Christiansen both appeared to 
make Bids. Dwane Sykes bid $1,000. William Christiansen offerred the 
full amount of the debt claimed by Zions. The trustee sold the sub-
ject property to him, transfering it by trustee's deed. (Addendum E ) . 
16. During these many legal skirmishes along the way, over a 
several year period, we were never able to get the real issues 
addressed. Finally, after being thwarted in various attempts to sell 
or refinance the land, due to the title having been slandered, our 
interest was forclosed on and bought by Mr. Dwane Sykes1 nominee. 
17. With that, the Sykes' claims for breach of contract were 
moot (they had obtained the property through the foreclosure). The 
lower court then dismissed his Complaint and, along with it, our 
counterclaim and third party complaints. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) allows for summary judgment only when 
the pleadings, etc., show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and contemplates that at least a hearing will be held 
prior to the granting of any such relief in these terms: "the motion 
shall be served at least ten days before the time fixed for the 
hearing (emphasis ours). 
2. An involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) is treated the same 
since it operates the same and has the same effect. Furthermore, both 
of these statutes are patterned precisely after the Federal Rule 
governing summary judgments which makes the hearing mandatory. Sub-
section (c) of the Utah Rule (56) refers to the hearing which is 
clearly contemplated, but does not make it mandatory. Rule 4-501(9), 
(Article 5) of the Code of Judicial Administration, requires such a 
hearing when requested by one of the parties. 
Since these rules were fashioned after the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, it is proper to examine decisions under the 
federal rules to determine the meanings thereof. Winegar v. 
Slim Olson, Inc., 122 Utah 487, 252 P. 2d 205 (Utah 1953)."~ 
3. Neither the federal courts nor this court have ever allowed a 
summary judgment (or dismissal) to stand where there was any question 
of material fact remaining. A citation which enunciates clearly this 
attitude can be found in the following case: 
No one has an inalienable or constitutional right to a 
judgment by default without a hearing on the merits. The 
courts, in the interest of justice and fair play, favor, 
where possible a full and complete opportunity for a hearing 
on the merits of every case. Heathman v. Fabian, 14 Utah 2d 
60, 377 P.2d 189 (Utah 1962). 
AGRUMENTS 
The lower court has summarily dismissed our counterclaims against 
the plaintiffs and our third party complaint against Provo Land Title. 
In granting summary dismissal of our claims, it has completely over-
looked and disregarded our very substantial case on many of the causes 
of action, at the very least. 
Summary judgment is proper only if pleadings, depositions, 
affidavits and admissions show that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and that moving party is entitled to 
judgment as matter of law; evidence, when viewed in light 
most favorable to loser, must show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact. Livingston Industries, Inc. 
LL Walker Bank £ Trust Co., 565 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1977). 
CONCLUSION 
This court has never allowed a party's claims to be dismissed 
summarily where there were yet issues of material fact to be decided. 
It has always held that all causes of action should be decided on 
their merits. We ask the Supreme Court to reverse Judge Mower's 
decision in dismissing our claims against the Sykes and Provo Land 
Title and remand this matter to the lower court with instructions. 
Respectfully submitted this <??Zt day of September, 1992. 
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ORDER and JUDGMENT 
Case number 63,695 
Hatch v. Zions, et al., 63,695, 57,125 and 57,127 
Order AND Judgment, Page -2-
DECISION - CASE NUMBER 57.125 
The Court intends to dismiss this case for failure to 
prosecute. 
ANALYSIS - CASE NUMBER 57,125 
Dwane J. Sykes and Patricia Sykes started this case in 
1981 by filing a complaint against Anthony Raggozine and Ruth 
W. Raggozine. The defendants answered on April 28, 1981. 
Plaintiffs noticed up some depositions for May 6, 1981. 
The next pleading in the file is a motion to 
consolidate made by plaintiffs in 1989, a time passage of eight 
years. 
I have seen nothing to justify such a delay. While it 
is true that there were other lawsuits concerning this property 
and its other owners and claimants, such should not have 
delayed the plaintiffs in moving forward with their claims 
against the Raggozines. 
DECISION - CASE NUMBER 63.695 
The Court intends to dismiss this action as to all 
pending parties, claims or motions. 
ANALYSIS - CASE NUMBER 63,695 
I. Plaintiffs' case. 
Howard F. Hatch, Marjorie S. Hatch and University 
Avenue Development Associates started this lawsuit on May 9, 
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1983 by filing a complaint. An amended complaint followed on 
August 3, 1983. Named as defendants were Zions First National 
Bank, Dwane J. Sykes, Virginia Flynn, and William Christiansen. 
A brief and perhaps oversimplified statement of 
plaintiffs1 claims in the amended complaint is: 
A* They were the owners and trustors of a piece of 
land which was scheduled to be sold at a 
trustee's sale; 
B. Virginia Flynn had agreed to rescue the 
plaintiffs from the sale; 
C. Mr. Sykes scared her off during a meeting at the 
trustee's lawyer's office; and 
D. The land was sold. 
Service of process was never made on Virginia Flynn. 
As a result, there is no cause of action against her. 
During the years this case has been pending, other 
third parties were brought in, but the causes against them have 
been disposed of, with the exception of $750.00, which will be 
discussed more fully, below. 
In. any event, the amended complaint remained as the 
written statement of plaintiffs' claims until June 11, 1990 
when they signed a stipulation with Zions First National Bank 
(the trustee referred to above). The stipulation caused the 
amended complaint to be changed in several ways. 
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To illustrate the changes, a "before and after" view 
may be helpful- Before the stipulation, the amended complaint 
contained five different prayers for relief, to-wit*: 
1. to set aside that certain conveyance dated May 
4, 1983, entitled trustee's deed, ..., declaring 
it to be null and void, thereby returning the 
property to the plaintiffs, or in the 
alternative to impose a constructive trust over 
said property until the rights of the parties 
can be established by this court; 
2. for equitable relief under the plaintiffs' 
complaint requiring defendant Zions to allow the 
plaintiffs a reasonable time in which to arrange 
for the money necessary to cure the default and 
to obtain a reconveyance of the trust deed; 
3. for punitive damages against the defendant Zions 
and Sykes of $450,000.00 for willful and 
malicious conduct in connection with the 
transaction which is the subject of this 
complaint; 
4. for actual damages of $150,000.00 in the event 
the property is lost by the plaintiffs through 
the actions of the defendants; 
5. and the costs of this action, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee together with such 
other relief as the court may deem just and 
proper. 
After the stipulation, the amended complaint contained 
three different prayers for relief, i.e.: 
1. for punitive damages against defendant Sykes of 
$450,000.00 for willful and malicious conduct in 
connection with the transaction which is the 
subject of this complaint; 
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2. for actual damages of $150,000.00 in the event 
the property is lost by the plaintiffs through 
the actions of the defendants; 
3. and the costs of this action, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee together with such 
other relief as the court may deem just and 
proper. 
The stipulation was approved by the Court. The 
resulting order not only dismissed Zions as a defendant but 
also removed* certain language from the amended complaint 
relating to claims for the land or the way in which it was sold 
at the trustee's sale. This quote from the stipulation is 
illustrative: 
Plaintiffs ... agree that the trustee's sale ... was a 
bona fide, arm's length, non-collusive, valid and 
binding Trustee's Sale. ... Plaintiffs ... waive and 
abandon any •.. claims and defenses ... which ... 
challenge or dispute the validity ... of the Trustee's 
Sale or the title of the purchaser at the Trustee's 
Sale. 
Upon William Christiansen's motion, the lawsuit was 
dismissed as against him. He was the purchaser at the 
trustee's sale. Plaintiffs had agreed to give up all claims 
against him. 
For the same reason, I am satisfied that plaintiffs' 
remaining causes of action against Mr. Sykes must also fail. 
Plaintiffs agreed to abandon anv claims to the validity of the 
trustee's sale. 
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Plaintiffs' remaining causes of action are based on 
the -loss of property" language in the prayer of the amended 
complaint. 
If "loss of property" means slander of title, then 
plaintiffs can recover no actual damages. Plaintiffs must hold 
some interest in the property in order to claim that it has 
been slandered. 
If "loss of property" is taken to mean that which is 
suggested by the words themselves, then plaintiffs cannot 
recover damages. So far as they are concerned, the property was 
lost at the trustee's sale. They have waived any claimed 
irregularity therein. 
Plaintiffs also claim punitive damages. However, 
punitive damages are derivative in nature and cannot be awarded 
in the absence of actual-damages. 
When the possibility of actual damages is gone, then 
the claim for punitive damages evaporates. 
Plaintiffs1 amended complaint, as it now stands, does 
not state a cause of action. Consequently, it must be dismissed. 
II. Defendant's case. 
Defendant filed a counterclaim in May of 1984. It 
contains eleven causes of action. 
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On February 4, 1991 a hearing was held in this case. 
Mr. Sykes was present at that hearing. He was ordered to 
prepare a list of all conceivable claims that he had against 
anyone in the three different cases, i.e., numbers 63,695 or 
57,127 or 57,125. He was ordered to submit the list by a 
certain date and to send copies. 
The deadline for filing the list was April 19, 1991. 
The reason for the deadline was that a further hearing was 
scheduled for April 29, 1991. Filing the list before the next 
hearing would give the Court, the parties and counsel a chance 
to review it in advance. 
Mr. Sykes did not meet the deadline. He brought the 
list with him to the hearing on April 29, 1991. 
This was not the first deadline Mr. Sykes missed. 
Throughout the time that the undersigned has been involved in 
these cases, Mr. Sykes has claimed that on various occasions he 
becomes ill and incapacitated. Perhaps he claimed that as the 
reason for not meeting the referenced filing deadline. 
However, I have never been totally satisfied that such 
episodes are true illnesses, in the sense that they are beyond 
his control. While it is true that Mr. Sykes has brought me a 
letter from his doctor, the letter tells me nothing about the 
nature or cause of the illness, only that it is incapacitating. 
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Mr. Mark F. Robinson, Mr. Sykes' former lawyer in 
these cases, did tell me about his observations of Mr. Sykes 
when he is ill. Mr. Robinson told me of Mr. Sykes being 
unable to speak or respond and of being unable to locate 
necessary documents. Mr. Robinson could not tell me anything 
about the cause of the Mr. Sykes' incapacity/ except that it 
was possibly stress-related. 
Court hearings are extremely stressful* Mr. Sykes has 
never failed to appear at any hearings because of illness. I 
have watched him during the hearings. He represents himself. 
He is well-dressed/ well-groomed, articulate and intelligent. 
He brings a great volume of papers with him to court. He is 
always able to locate and handle documents when the need arises. 
I apologize to Mr. Sykes for any offense I may have 
caused by my comments her.ein. I do not intend to offend him by 
calling him a malingerer. I simply do not know if he is or not. 
If he is# then sanctions are appropriate. If he is 
not/ then he should have hired counsel to assist him. He has 
not done so. Sanctions should be imposed. 
The sanction imposed is that Mr. Sykes1 counterclaim 
is stricken. 
DECISION - CASE NUMBER 57,127 
The Court intends to dismiss this case as a sanction 
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against Mr. Sykes, since it is the same as his counterclaim in 
number 63,695. 
ANALYSIS - CASE NUMBER 57,127 
Dennis L. Sykes, Dwane J. Sykes, Patricia Sykes, and 
Johnny Iverson started this lawsuit in May of 1981 by filing a 
complaint. Named as defendants were: Howard F« Hatch, 
Marjorie S. Hatch, Howard Hatch and Associates, and Equitable 
Realty Inc. 
At the time of filing, plaintiffs were represented by 
counsel. However, their counsel later withdrew. 
Since the case has been assigned to me, I have never 
met Dennis L. Sykes nor Patricia Sykes nor Johnny Iverson. Mr. 
Dwane Sykes has told me that he represents their interests, 
but, of course, he is not an attorney and cannot speak for them. 
Nevertheless, it- is fairly easy for me to conclude 
that Dwane Sykes is the real party in interest, not only 
because of what he says, but also because, in spite of notices 
to the other plaintiffs, no one but Mr. Dwane Sykes ever 
appears at court hearings. 
The complaint in this case is the same cause of action 
as the counterclaim in case number 63,695. Consequently, the 
same sanction should be imposed. The complaint in this case is 
stricken. 
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WHAT TO DO WITH THE &7^ fl? 
Earlier in these proceedings, Mr. Sykes v»s ordered to 
deposit certain funds with the Clerk. He complied with that 
order by giving the Clerk control over an interest-bearing bank 
savings account with a balance of more than $15,000*00. At the 
Court's direction, the Clerk eventually disbursed all but 
$750.00 of those funds. 
It appeared that at least $500.00 of the account 
balance belonged to Mr. Sykes. At the time the Clerk was 
directed to disburse funds, I allowed a contingency balance for 
any interest which may have accrued. This is the source of the 
$750.00. 
Since all claims in these cases are being dismissed 
today, the ownership of the $750.00 is left at issue. 
Dwane J. Sykes is awarded the $750.00. However, this 
order is contingent. The contingencies are: (1) the arrival of 
September 1, 1991, and (2) there being no other written claims 
to the money in the Court's file on that date. 
If the contingencies are met, then the Clerk is 
authorized and directed to disburse the funds, together with 
any accrued interest, to Mr. Sykes. If the contingencies are 
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not met, the Clerk is directed to consult with the undersigned 
and to set the matter for further hearing. 
Dated this ^-^ day of July, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
( V uJi 
D aVi^KL. Mowe r 
Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 23rd day July, 
1991, I served a full, true and correct copy of the within and 
foregoing Order and Judgment on the following by depositing a 
copy in the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Spencer F. Hatch, 19221 Sherborne Lane, 
Huntington Beach, CA 92646 
Howard F. Hatch, 843 South 1150 East, Pleasant 
Grove, Ut 84063 
Sam Primavera, 37 East 400 North, Provo, Utah 
84601 
Dwane Sykes, 1511 South Carterville Road, Orem, 
Utah 84068 
Ruth Ragozzine, 662 West 190 North, Hurricane, 
Ut 84737 
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DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Howard F. Hatch, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Case number 63,695 
Zions First National Bank, et 
al. , 
Defendants. 
Dwane J. Sykes, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case number 57,125 
Ruth Ragozzine, 
Defendant. 
Dennis L. Sykes, et al.. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Howard F. Hatch, et al., 
Defendants. 
On July 23, 1991 the undersigned made an order in this and 
two other consolidated cases. The intent of the order was to 
dismiss all of the causes of action in all three cases. 
= * % ' 
COURT'S SUA SPONTE ORDER 
REGARDING THIRD-PARTY 
COMPLAINT AGAINST PROVO 
LAND TITLE 
0068D 
SYKES VS. HATCH, 57,127 
SUA SPONTE ORDER, Page -2-
The order was appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the 
appeals and remitted the cases because a counterclaim and a 
third-party complaint in this case remain outstanding. 
A portion of the third-party complaint names Provo Land 
Title as a third-party defendant. However, a reading of the 
document shows that, while Provo Land Title is referred to in 
the factual allegations, no claim for relief is made against it. 
Provo Land Title answered and claimed as one of its 
defenses that the third-party complaint failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted. 
The third-party complaint does fail to state a claim 
against Provo Land Title upon which relief can be granted. 
On that basis, the third-party complaint is dismissed. 
Dated: J_/Al/19±t 1 . _^f (^U^>^ ft-
(—-Bdvid L. Mower 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing COURT'S SUA SPONTE ORDER REGARDING THIRD-PARTY 
COMPLAINT AGAINST PROVO LAND TITLE was served by U. S. Mail, on 
the ? — day of January, 1992, on the following: 
CASE #57,127: 
Douglas M. Whitehead 
Olsen, Hintze, Nielson and Hill 
Jamestown Square, Suite 200 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah (84604) 
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TO WUflH IT MAT COMCEWi: s«l-St ' ^ 
vntlcc it hereby given that thJ undereigned has en intereet In that 
certain raal proparty aituata In Ut/h County, Stata of Utah, deecribed aa 
folio*"* Beginning at a cornerpoat/0* tha Eaat aide of Certerville Boad, which > 
- - - . _ . -_ . « . - ^ ^ ^  ,* _^ *»_c^  
«, point
 %», 
to a fancas thaAca S 84* lOfc1 E about 223.18 f t along'a fence; thence continuing 
along tha fence * 41* 57' E 61.04 f t ; thence M 37* 551 £ 166.14 f t ; thence N 52# 18« £ 
37.64 f t ; thane* N 73# 331 £ 26.42 i t ; thane* N 33* 51» £ 59.36 f t ; thanca 3 7* 291 £ 
194.62 f t ; thanca S 13# 0i< V 63*42 f t ; thanca S 1* 531 V 129.41 f t ; thanca S 16> 38' £ 
67.57 f t ; thane* 3 6# 56« ¥ 70.69 f t ; thanca S 24* 42* £ 148.45 f t ; thanca H 82° 53' V 
195.33 f t ; thanca S 6* 16' W 41.96 f t ; thanca V 62# 42' V 305.94 f t ; thanca N 66# 03' W 
33.77 f t ; thanca N 2* 12' £ 90.0 f t ; thanca H 85* 18' V 142.0 f t to tha Point of 
Beginning, aa par "Survey Of Proparty For H. Van Wants, nade by Carr F. Grear, Bagr.t 
lug. 1966. updated June 1971* (with eubaequent aala aodlficatlona); EXCEPTING TOEREPRpM 
THE FGLLCWIHG DESCRIBED }-acre ialand-portion thereof retained by Anthony and Ruth 
Ragosslne, togftbar with tha houaa and a l l inproveiaenta tharalni Beginning at a point 
M 620 f t and Eaat 1667.4 f t from tha Waat quarter cornar of Sac. "25, T6S, R2E, SU&M; 
thanca V 76 f t ; thanca £ 160 f t ; thanca S 136 f t ; thanca V 160 f t ; thanoa M 60 ft to the 
point of baginn^ig* *be oontxmctad land onntalna about 6.5 acree. 
Tha South balf la an unconditional aala-purchaaa option of exactly 3.25 acraa with 
151.25 f t of ftontaga on Cartanrilla Boad and lying aaat nnd nouth of (continued below) 
Said interest la evidenced by a certain )J/////j4 Raal Eat ace Contract 
option dated * » • 6, 1974
 9 by and between 
U0U4BD F. HATCH and MUUQR2E S. HATCH of Provo, U t a h / 
Aa Sill** and tna undaralgnad aa auyerjT. £i#**«v ^ . o o l - o t * 0 * * ^-
^ DENNIS L. sassfa logan/Utah 
SuboCtibad and avoro to bafora aa thla /~ day of V**rt. 
3} 0 f 
/'. * «^\£\ Notary Public 
•'••UIMH»»* 'UtltM*1 (oon*t) that frontaga and (nostly) south of tha antranca driveway and vraping around tha 
J-*cra houaa parcal and on eaat into tha pond) tha aala-ourchaaa or tha remaining 
half-portion oortk of the cotrsne* ^rivawjr, bait j about 3< acrea aora or laaa and lncludijw 
part of tha H*SO"ii* houaa• a landaeaping and pond and alao containing 151.25 f t front- g 
ago on ^ r U r v i n a Boad, i . oonditional upon buyar or hia aaal«na firat having tiaaly ? 
purchaaad fro0^thlrd^partija (Bagoazinaa) within tw> y w . tha J-acr. houaa parcaHying ^ 
betMaao thaaa t i* halvaa, bafora aignificant reaidantual oonatruction (footlnga) ba K 
undartakan tar MUff* harain, north portion optiooad U Idantical par-*cra orica and Q 
tana
 M aoub portion, iniJluding ai l irrigation ymUr. *. s-T 7 ^ 7 ^ 
NOTICE OF PRIOR AND SUPERIOR INTEREST IN 
REAL PROPERTY AND OF PHYSICAL POSSESSION 
PRIOR TO AND THEREBY SUBORDINATING ZIONS 
BANK'S APRTI 14, 1978, DEED OF TRUST, 
IRRESPECTIVE OF RECORDING DATES. 
State of Utah ) 
) ss 
Cc „nty of Utah ) 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
Notice is hereby given that by virtue of their prior but 
unrecorded contracts, options, excerises and rignts and of their 
open, actual, exclusive occupancies and possessions, respectively 
beginning in about 1973 as to part and 1975 as to other parts, 
that the below named persons have and claim a prior and superior 
interest in all of that real property located at about 1475 to 
1509 South Carterville Road, Orem, Utah County, State of Utah, 
more specifically described in Schedule "A" attached hereto. 
These claims affect and thereby subordinate that certain 
Deed of Trust on the identically described property dated and 
recorded April 14, 1978, as Entry No. 14230 at Book 1637, Pages 
272-275 of the official records of the County Recorder of Utah 
County, from Howard F. Hatch and Marjorie S. Hatch as Trustors 
and Zions First National Bank as both Trustee and Benificiary. 
Anyone who purchases or negotiates for any interest in said 
property or anyone who now bids upon or purchases the rights of 
or any interest in Zions' abovesaid Deed of Trust does so at his 
own peril and takes such interest with retroactive "actual 
notice" and subject to all the below referrenced claims, law-
suits, and title status regardless of recording date or whether 
such were not eventually recorded until after Z ions1 interest on 
April 14, 1978, or ever. Such bidders/purchasers may receive 
nothing for their payment. 
The Utah law on property possession vs. recording, as to its 
binding notice to third-party lenders, purchasers, trustees and 
dealers, is quoted as follows: 
Utah Statutes Annotated 57-1-6. Every conveyance... and 
every instrument...whereby any real estate may be affected, 
to operate as notice to third persons shall be...recorded in 
the office of the recorder..., but shall be valid and 
binding between the parties thereto...and as to all other 
persons who have had actual notice. 
ACTUAL NOTICE. 
Under this section actual possession and occupancy 
amounts to "actual notice" to all the world of 
grantee's rights even if his deed is not recorded. 
Neponset Land & Live Stock Co. v. Dixon, 10 Utah 
334 
Actual occupancy is enough to put parties dealing 
with the premises upon inquiry.... The demands of this 
section are answered if a party dealing with the land 
has information of a fact or facts that would put a 
prudent man upon inquiry and would, i£ pursued, lead to 
actual knowledge of the state of the title; this is 
actual notice. Toland v Corey, 6 Utah 392, affd. in 38 
L. Ed. 1062, distinguished in 53 Utah 468... 
...[the claim] is binding as to defendant who had 
actual notice because of the claimant's occupancy of 
the property. Peterson v. Callister, 6 Utah 2d 359, 
affd in 8 Utah 2nd 348.... (emphasis added). 
RELEVANT PHYSICAL POSSESSION FACTS: 
"Pierotti Place": From about July 30, 1973, to about Sept. 
15, 1979, that house and yard (a rectangle of about 70 ft. front-
aae on Carterville Road and about 145 ft. deep along Hope Lane) 
^ 
& 
^ 
* 
openly* visibly, exclusively and continuously occuppied and 
possessed by Leon Peter and Karen E. Pierotti (in part under an 
unrecorded Uniform «Real Estate Contract from Howard F. and 
Marjorie S. Hatch to said Pierottis, dated July 30, 1973) and 
from about Sept. 15, 1979 to date, similarly occupied by their 
lawful successors in interest, Johnny M. Iverson et. al. and 
their respective tenants (Stacy & Cindy Smith); said occupied 
land includes not only that portion of Schedule "A" denoted 
"LESS...." (originally included in Zions Bank's April 14, 1978 
Deed of Trust and partially released subsequently) but also a 
sign i ficant portion of the unreleased, continuing trust property. 
"SYKES PROPERTY": Since about 1975 to date, the entire 
balance of the nonexcluded property in Schedule "A", being irreg-
ular-shaped orchard and pasture land, has been actually, physic-
ally, notoriously, visibly, openly exclsuively, hostily and con-
tinuously occupied and possessed by the Sykes family, Dwane J., 
Patricia, and Dennis L. Sykes, which persons have conducted the 
caretaking, cultivating, weekly irrigating, harvesting, pas-
turing, spraying, ditch-digging, fertilizing, etc, and which 
persons have paid all real estate taxes since about 1975 (in part 
under a Option and Notice of Interest in Real Property dated June 
6, 1974, from Howard F. and Marjorie S. Hatch to Sykes, the same 
timely excerised on or about March 20, 1975, and thereafter). 
During this time to date, around the perimiter of said property 
the the Sykes have placed and maintained conspicious signs sta-
ting "SYKES LAND — NO TRESPASSING" and "NOTICE: PROPERTY OF D. 
SYKES, 1511 SO. CARTERVILLE RD, OREM, UT. PH 225-0686; NO TRES-
PASSING" and other signs and warnings with words to that effect. 
Thus, when Zions First National Bank accepted its above 
cited Deed of Trust to this property on or about April 14, 1978, 
by. operation of law Zions Bank was deemed to have had "actual 
notice" of the title status of said property and of the various 
claims thereto ascertainable upon prudent inquiry from those 
whom for years had been and were then openly occupying said 
property, which claims are now under ligitation in Sykes et. al. 
v. Hatch et. al., Civil Case No. 57,127 (LIS PENDENS recorded at 
Book 1905 Page 182 on this same said property) and Sykes vs 
Ragozzine, Civil Case No. 57125, and including those claims and 
notices recorded at Book 1867 Pages 69-87, those $ 10,000.00 Aug. 
14, 1974, and $25,000.00 Oct. 15, 1976, Deeds of Trust of Fron-
tier International Land Corp. recorded at Book 1849 Pages 802-
806, and all then existant but unrecorded claims and notices 
which have been subsequently recorded, including but not limited 
to those in the title report attached hereto as Schedule "B". 
It is noted that even if Zions Bank had not taken the care 
or precaution to visit and physically inspect the property or 
appraise its condition and/or value that Zions Bank still would 
be held accountable for "actual notice" and constructive know-
ledge of the above said title status and claims. 
However in this case Zions Bank through its employees and e» 
agents did personally visit, inspect and appraise the premises o 
prior to April 14, 1978, and were thereupon personally informed j^ 
by persons in possession about the above said ownership claims C 
and status and about the signs and notices posted about the C 
property. Thus Zions Bank also had direct, benificial knowledge. 
Dated this 2nd day of September, 1982 
C 
The above named claimants continue today to be in open, ^ 
physical, exclusive, occupancy as abovesaid of all the property W 
described in Schedule "A", and all potential purchasers, bidders S 
or dealers in any interest in said property or said Zions Bank 
Deed of Trust are likewise charged with "actual notice" of above 
said title and claims, regardless of recording dates. 
Dwan« L Patricu Syket 
1511 S. CartervlUe Road 
Orem, Utah 3405 
Dwane 
Dwane J. Sykes, Patricia Svkes 
llNhdl^m^ IZ&Lt^Wf-kh"&<y 
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